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In developing countries, formal institutional mechanisms are often weak 
or do not exist, which can hinder a market-based allocation of water. 
Informal groundwater markets are one of the informal institutional 
arrangement which acts as an alternative means to facilitate such 
allocation. The first two chapters are the thesis investigates the relative 
bargaining of contractual agents and choice of contract types in Indian 
informal groundwater markets. I find that sellers have relatively more 
bargaining power to decide about the contract. This suggests that the 
informal groundwater markets are far from competitive markets. Further, 
we found that the choice of contract type is motivated by the risk-sharing 
incentive. 
The third chapter studies the role of kinship on trust and 
trustworthiness in rural India. We found kin are trusted more than non-
kin, and a large fraction of the variation can be explained by high kin 
altruism. We evidenced that trustworthiness of kins’ depends on how 
close they are within their kin network.
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